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Jane Stadler 
Cinesonic Imagination: 
The Somatic, the Sonorous, 
and the Synaesthetic
 “Starving the eye will inevitably bring the ear, and therefore the imagination, more into play,” according to acclaimed sound 
designer Randy Thom. This insight captures a central 
tenet of this article—the way imagination feasts on 
absence—and it prompts reflection on whether the 
imagination synaesthetically translates one sensory 
modality into another when a sense is “starved,” or 
when what is visibly present misaligns with what the 
ear apprehends. Imagination is central to the design 
and reception of cinematic soundscapes. In addition 
to audible properties, sound has tactile1 and intangible 
qualities that raise further questions: is the cinematic 
imagination best understood as a cognitive process 
involving image formation, or does it include embod-
ied, affective dimensions? 
 While one might expect imagination to provide 
a natural meeting point for screen studies and phi-
losophy, given that the term itself suggests the fertile 
union of images and ideas central to both disciplines, 
Julian Hanich is one of the few philosophers of film 
to have systematically worked through various facets 
of the cinematic imagination.2 In “Omission, Sugges-
tion, Completion: Film and the Imagination of the 
1. Regarding tactile, haptic, and inaudible sounds see Coulthard, “Hap-
tic Aurality”; Kerins, Beyond Dolby (29, 36); and Stadler, “Experiential 
Realism” (453-54).
2. See also Evans’s work on mental imagery and sense perception in 
“Imagination and the Senses”; Lefebvre’s theory regarding the formation 
of mental images in “On Memory and Imagination in the Cinema”; 
McIver Lopes’s analysis of cinematic representation and experience in 
“Imagination, Illusion and Experience in Film”; Pettersson’s contribu-
tion to philosophical aesthetics in “Seeing What Is Not There: Pictorial 
Experience, Imagination and Non-localization”; Murray Smith’s influ-
ential work on self-focused personal or central imagining and imper-
sonal or acentral imagining in Engaging Characters and more recently in 
Film, Art, and the Third Culture; my own chapter, “Imagination: Inner 
Sight and Silent Voices”; Stock’s examination of the kind of imagining 
and supposition that is called for by fictional narratives in Only Imagine; 
Spectator,” Hanich deftly classifies different forms of 
ellipsis and imaginative synthesis and details the ways 
in which sensory perception and imagination inter-
relate phenomenologically and aesthetically in cin-
ematic experience. While aesthetic philosophers such 
as Roger Scruton acknowledge that imagination can 
have a moral character because it plays a role in un-
derstanding art and educating the emotions, there is 
a longstanding suspicion of the relationship between 
cinema and imagination (41-43). For instance, Scru-
ton claims that spectatorship involves little imagina-
tive effort or reward because, rather than evoking “the 
thing that is not there,” film realizes its subject for the 
audience with the presentation of a simulacrum (41). 
Unconvincingly, Scruton suggests that cinema’s sen-
sory and emotional gratifications prevent imagination 
from doing its work.3
 With Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1979 film Stalker as its 
case study, this article explores misconceptions about 
the relationship between imagery and imagination. 
Focusing on the relatively neglected territory of cin-
ematic soundscapes, I canvas approaches to imagina-
tion in cognitive film theory and phenomenology in 
order to investigate sound design and film spectator-
ship in relation to philosophical accounts of imagina-
tion. In doing so, I aim to counterbalance the tendency 
to privilege visual images and cognition by consider-
ing overlooked aspects of imaginative experience that 
Stalker exemplifies and that screen media elicit, such 
as affect and synaesthesia. I conclude by considering 
the implications of technological advances in game-
and Szczepanik’s discussion of the synaesthetic qualities of silent cinema 
in “Sonic Imagination.”
3. Similarly, as Hanich points out, Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno suggest cinema is guilty of “repressing the powers of imagina-
tion” because sound film, as an exemplar of consumer culture, is so 
closely identified with the reality it purports to represent that it inhibits 
imaginative exploration (Horkheimer and Adorno 99-100).
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play and virtual reality for understanding embodied, 
imaginative engagement with new media.  
 Although a thorough exploration of the imagina-
tive horizons of technological change lies beyond the 
scope of this study, it is worth noting that Stalker has 
had several sound mixes, its image has been remastered, 
and its title has been adapted into interactive comput-
er games. Stalker’s original Mosfilm soundtrack was 
monophonic, yet as technology has advanced, differ-
ent sound mixes have been released, including Fox 
Lorber’s 1998 VHS mix, RusCiCo’s 2002 5.1 DVD 
surround track with added music and sound effects, 
and Criterion Collection’s 2017 Blu-ray that offers a 
2K digital restoration of the original 35mm film nega-
tive along with the original Russian 1.0 LPCM Mono 
soundscape. While acknowledging that each version 
occasions imaginative variances and that contempo-
rary cinema technologies, such as Dolby Atmos and 
low-frequency effects, may produce enhanced spatial 
and sensory immersion that could augment embod-
ied imaginative experience, this article focuses on the 
original 1979 version. 
 Stalker takes the audience away from the mono-
chrome reality of domestic life into a dangerous, re-
stricted area where time and space are distorted, fol-
lowing a hired guide known as Stalker and his clients, 
a writer and a professor, as they seek to enter a room 
in the Zone where wishes are granted.4 In his book 
Sculpting in Time, Tarkovsky articulates interest in 
“the interior world of the individual imagination” and 
how it is “possible to reproduce what a person sees 
within himself, all his dreams, both sleeping and wak-
ing” (71). Stalker’s evocative soundscape exposes in-
teriority and brings oneiric, ineffable elements to the 
screen and in this film Tarkovsky achieves far more 
than a reproduction of “what a person sees within 
4. For scholarly criticism of Tarkovsky’s films, see Smith’s “The Edge 
of Perception: Sound in Tarkovsky’s Stalker”; Dunne’s edited collection, 
Tarkovsky, with chapters on Russia, religion, and literary, philosophical, 
and artistic influences; and Johnson and Petrie’s The Films of Andrei Tark-
ovsky.
himself,” even if we take sight to be associated with 
knowledge and reproduction to involve more artistry 
than mimesis. 
 Imagination’s relation to the production of imag-
ery (seeing with the mind’s eye) is founded in philo-
sophical accounts that frame imagination in terms of 
images that mediate between objects and ideas. One 
aspect of imagination—mimesis—relates to imitation 
and forging illusions, while the other—phantasia—
refers to perceiving or being deceived by fantastical 
images. This view of imagination is hardly favourable, 
given Plato’s allegory of humans imprisoned in a cave 
of illusions like spectators in a cinema, captivated by a 
shadow play of images and unable to perceive the real 
forms on which these representations are based.5 This 
link between imagination, images, and deception car-
ries through René Descartes’s suspicions of the evil 
demon manipulating appearances and more recent 
perspectives on visual media by Jean-Louis Baudry, 
Jean Baudrillard, and Gregory Currie in their work 
on simulation, spectatorship, and the illusory power 
of images.6
 The image’s lack of truth status has led Kendall 
Walton to suggest that we “make believe” that cin-
ematic events and characters are real because “imag-
ining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true. 
What is true is to be believed; what is fictional is to be 
5. See Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” in Chapter XXV (vii. 541a-521b) 
of The Republic.
6. See Baudrillard’s The Evil Demon of Images; Baudry’s “Ideological 
Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus”; Currie’s Image and 
Mind; and Descartes’s “First Meditation.”
 [...] I aim to counterbalance the ten-
dency to privilege visual images and 
cognition by considering overlooked 
aspects of imaginative experience that 
Stalker exemplifies and that screen me-
dia elicit, such as affect and synaesthe-
sia.
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imagined” (41). Currie argues that we imagine screen 
events occur without needing to attribute reality sta-
tus to them because we run our actual beliefs “off-
line” and experience imaginative activity that simu-
lates belief (148). In response, Derek Matravers asks, 
“if we believe the event took place within a fiction,” 
then “why do we need to imagine it as well?” (195).7 
Matravers advocates avoiding the term imagination 
altogether in accounts of film spectatorship, claiming 
that distinct mental states are not needed to respond 
to perceptions versus representations. I contend that 
the focus on belief in these accounts is misplaced and 
that sensory perception of representations and images 
often involves imaginative activity.
 Imagination’s mediating role between percep-
tion, representation, and ideas has preoccupied many 
thinkers, from Immanuel Kant’s categories of produc-
tive, reproductive, and transcendental imagination8 
to Edward Casey’s work on the phenomenology of 
imagination.9 These theorists detail imagination’s re-
lationship to perceptions of the material world, rang-
ing from the invocation of objects that are not present 
to the senses to the construction of non-existent pos-
sibilities. However, evaluating imagination in relation 
to the “real” has led to imagination being considered 
a lower form of cognition than reason. Cognitive film 
theorist Berys Gaut contends, “a better account of 
imagination would hold that to imagine something 
is to entertain it, without asserting it. That is, the 
imaginer is not committed to the truth of the rep-
resentational content concerned” (333). For Gaut, 
the difference lies in “the kind of mental act directed 
at the representational content” (333). With respect 
to Stalker, Gaut may agree that without believing in 
the existence of a forbidden zone in which time and 
space do not obey the laws of physics and flowers have 
no scent, we can still entertain the conceivability of 
such a zone being created by an apocalyptic event. Yet 
Gaut’s account of imagination, like Walton’s and Cur-
7. See also Matravers’s chapter on fiction and the imagination in his 
monograph Fiction and Narrative where he expresses skepticism as to 
how perceiving images might exercise the imagination when watching 
films: “Why should the imagination be thought constitutive of a visual 
experience of a representation? The point is pithily stated by Richard 
Wollheim, who, again, contrasts the two notions, claiming that ‘imagi-
nation has no necessary part to play in the perception of what is repre-
sented’ … [D]epictive representations do not involve the imagination 
simply in virtue of being depictive representations” (148-49).
8. Kant theorises various functions of imagination in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, where he distinguishes between images and concepts and 
discusses imagination’s role in synthesising the two (104-05), and in the 
Critique of Judgment, where he examines imagination’s sensory aspects 
and its generative, productive qualities (94, 182, 243, 314).
9. See Casey’s Imagining: A Phenomenological Study.
rie’s, remains focused on mental acts and the relation-
ship between what is represented and what is real. 
 This overview highlights two things that have thus 
far been neglected in accounts of the cinematic imagi-
nation: sound has been ignored by comparison with 
image, and cognitive acts like hypothesizing have been 
privileged over the affective and multisensory dimen-
sions of imagination. Imaginative experience is not 
reducible to mental acts or the formation of mental 
images; the imagination extends insight and percep-
tiveness beyond appearances into the realm of affect 
and ideas and, as Hanich points out, cognitive film 
studies has yet to explore the experience of “sensual 
completion, the acts of imagining the absent.” Hence, 
I turn to a phenomenological perspective on sound 
and imaginative experience to address this gap. 
 Absence is one of imagination’s invariant features—
it is a quality that Jean-Paul Sartre focuses on in his 
account of nothingness10 and that Don Ihde writes 
of in A Phenomenology of Sound when he says, “it 
is to the invisible that listening may attend” (14). As 
phenomenologist Erez Nir claims, “in imagination 
the object is present in a marginal way and what is di-
rectly experienced is the object’s affective form, which 
is an intuitive aspect of the object’s value qualities” 
(52).11 Consequently, Nir sees imagination as “a pres-
ence of experience and an absence of an object” (56), 
which leads to “the peculiar ability to have an affective 
experience of something without its presence” (57). 
How, then, does this haunting absence or attentional 
invocation of presence relate to affective experience in 
10. See Sartre’s The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the 
Imagination and McGinn’s Mindsight (29).
11. Nir rightly critiques accounts of imagination that focus on the truth 
status “of the imaginative object at the expense of the imaginative experi-
ence as a whole” (52).
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the acoustic imagination, and what might we learn 
from Stalker?
 In Audio-Vision, composer and sound theorist 
Michel Chion discusses the cinesonic imagination, 
stating: “the question of listening with the ear is in-
separable from that of listening with the mind, just 
as looking is with seeing” (33). This suggests that per-
ception and cognition are entwined, and that we may 
characterize listening with the mind’s ear and seeing 
with the mind’s eye as imaginative experiences that 
extend beyond narrative comprehension, optical vi-
suality, and causal listening into the realm of haptic-
ity, emotion, and mood or atmosphere. Tarkovsky 
claims:
In itself, accurately recorded sound adds nothing to 
the image system of cinema, for it still has no aes-
thetic content. As soon as the sounds of the visible 
world are removed from it, or that world is filled, 
for the sake of the image, with extraneous sounds 
that don’t exist literally, or if the real sounds are dis-
torted so that they no longer correspond with the 
image—then the film acquires a resonance. (162)
The correspondence of sound with image to which 
Tarkovsky refers is precisely what phenomenolo-
gist Vivian Sobchack interrogates in “When the Ear 
Dreams.” For Sobchack, the sonic imagination relates 
to the imaginative qualities of cinematic sound design 
and is expressed in moments when “sound originates, 
dominates, and shapes the image, rather than the im-
age dominating and grounding (or anchoring) the 
sound” (4). Sobchack engages with Chion’s concepts 
of “acousmatic sound” (Chion 32), which is sound 
divorced from its visible source, and the practice of 
“reduced listening,” which “focuses on the traits of 
the sound itself, independent of its cause and of its 
meaning” (Chion 29). Reduced listening could also 
be termed phenomenological listening; similar to the 
process of phenomenological reduction, reduced lis-
tening disrupts established preconceptions as we at-
tend to the inherent qualities of sound. Chion claims 
that reduced listening reveals how “the emotional, 
physical, and aesthetic value of a sound is linked not 
only to the causal explanation we attribute to it but 
also to its own qualities of timbre and texture, to its 
own personal vibration” (31).
 In his foreword to Audio-Vision, Walter Murch 
suggests that the “sensory incompleteness” arising 
when sound and image are not realistically fused “en-
gages the imagination of the viewer” through “the 
metaphoric use of sound” and that “by choosing care-
fully what to eliminate, and then reassociating differ-
ent sounds that seem at first hearing to be somewhat 
at odds with the accompanying image, the filmmaker 
can open up a perceptual vacuum into which the 
mind of the audience must inevitably rush” (xx). Fill-
ing the “perceptual vacuum” of “sensory incomplete-
ness” is central to the cinematic imagination. The pro-
cess by which designers render sounds and audiences 
interpret them boils down to “translating one order of 
sensation into another” (Chion 112). When Chion 
speaks of “‘transliterating’ tactile sensations into audi-
tory sensations,” he is effectively describing cinematic 
synaesthesia (112). According to Jennifer Barker, syn-
esthesia “is a phenomenon in which a stimulus in one 
sense modality triggers automatically additional sen-
sory response(s) in a different sense modality” (378). 
Indeed, when Barker states that “film draws our at-
tention, consciously or otherwise, to something that 
is both within us and beyond us, both elemental and 
deeply strange. In other words, synesthesia haunts us 
from the inside” (375), she could well be describing 
Stalker. It is a film that uses exquisite cinematography 
and artfully composed sound and music as well as el-
emental aspects such as water to evoke an imaginative, 
 It is a film that uses exquisite cinema-
tography and artfully composed sound 
and music as well as elemental aspects 
such as water to evoke an imaginative, 
multisensory engagement with Stalker’s 
subjectivity and with the Zone itself. 
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multisensory engagement with Stalker’s subjectivity 
and with the Zone itself. 
 For instance, when Stalker beckons to his weary 
companions and they speculate that his tone suggests 
he will start sermonizing, they are resting in a place 
that seems damp and cold. The sound of running wa-
ter gives way to aqueous droplets falling into a pool, 
although no water is visible; suddenly the sonorous 
splash of something heavy plunging into deep water 
forms a sound bridge that Sobchack might say “origi-
nates, dominates and shapes” the next image. The 
camera peers down into a dark well and the sound 
waves of the object dropped into the well are translated 
into the realm of the visible as rippling, wavering, ab-
stract imagery of light on water, soon accompanied by 
limpid music and Stalker’s disembodied voice. Here 
acousmatic sound conveys the characters’ experiences 
of touch, temperature, weight, and depth as well as 
giving access to the voice of Stalker’s mind. Sound’s 
rhythmic and tactile qualities elicit the audience’s em-
bodied imagination, creating emotive emplacement 
in the story world. As sound designer Mark Ward ar-
gues, “the crafting of a sonic element is focused upon 
the task of designing affect at both the sensory and 
narrative levels” (163). Where the sensory and nar-
rative aspects intersect, the affective qualities of the 
sonic imagination are most illuminating in Stalker as 
sound insidiously manipulates affective responses:
 On one hand, sound works on us directly, physi-
 ologically (breathing noises in a film can directly 
 affect our own respiration). On the other, sound 
 has an influence on perception … it interprets the 
 meaning of the image, and makes us see in the 
 image what we would not otherwise see, or would 
 see differently. (Chion 34)
In Stalker, this becomes evident in relation to rhyth-
mic sounds dissociated from images during the rail 
journey into the Zone.
 In the rail scene, the diegetic mechanical noise of the 
draisine clattering rhythmically on the tracks gradually 
transforms into synthesized music as the protagonists 
move from monochrome reality toward the verdant 
but lethal Zone. Music and sound conjoin to express 
something increasingly inhuman and unknown, but 
this is not the case in the adulterated 5.1 remix, where 
the whole sequence is overdubbed with obtrusive 
music. It is the subtle elision of distinctions between 
ambient, organic environmental sounds, mechanical 
sound effects, and Eduard Artemyev’s entrancing un-
derscore that draws into question the nature of the 
diegetic space that the characters and the audience are 
entering in the original film. When the railcar stops at 
the threshold of the Zone, Stalker calls it “the quietest 
place in the world.” As he falls silent, the low static 
hiss of the original monaural soundtrack gives a sense 
that the Zone is alive with the crackle of electricity 
(though this uncanny effect has been expunged from 
the digitally remastered Blu-ray release). Arguably, it 
is this encounter with the inhuman and the unknown 
that enlivens the sonic imagination through the use 
of off-screen and non-diegetic sound. As the travelers 
remark on their discomfort in this strange place, the 
sound of running water leaks into the soundtrack and 
an unearthly, reverberant howl emanates from deep 
in the Zone, offering sonic realization of the protago-
nists’ fears about the dangerous space they are about 
to enter and communicating apprehensiveness to the 
audience. As Ward claims, “cinema recruits our body’s 
innate capacity for ‘feeling into’ another’s affective 
state” and “cinematic sound design is an embodied 
process of experiential knowing” (185-86). The dis-
tant howl, the trickle of unseen water, and abstracted 
sounds of the railcar are unmoored from images on 
screen. These inexplicable sounds do not produce nar-
rative comprehension, but offer a form of knowledge 
through the senses and through the evocation of af-
fect, mood, and what Tarkovsky refers to as “emotion-
al tone” (158). Tarkovsky explains crafting emotional 
tone and atmosphere thus: 
 Everything will begin to reverberate in response to 
 the dominant note: things, landscape, actors’ in-
 tonation … One thing will be echoed by another 
 … and an atmosphere will come into being … in 
 Stalker, … the atmosphere that came to exist as a
 result was more active and emotionally compell-
 ing than that of any of the films I had made previ-
 ously. (194)
The prevalence of sonic metaphors in Tarkovsky’s de-
scription of atmosphere is noteworthy here, with re-
verberation, intonation, dominant notes, and echoes 
intermingling with elements of mise-en-scène, such 
as setting and performance. Similarly, in his article 
about cinematic moods, film-philosopher Robert 
Sinnerbrink notes that cinema historian Lotte Eis-
ner “frequently used the term Stimmung (meaning 
 Arguably, it is this encounter with 
the inhuman and the unknown that 
enlivens the sonic imagination through 
the use of off-screen and non-diegetic 
sound.
Philosophy and New Media  /  Articles 13
mood, attunement or atmosphere)” in her work; for 
Eisner, Stimmung “evokes a ‘musical condition of the 
soul’, encompassing both ‘psychical acoustics and the 
harmony of vibrations’” (Sinnerbrink 149).
 In 2012, three articles about cinematic mood were 
published: the aforementioned piece by Sinnerbrink 
as well as work by Carl Plantinga and John Rhym. 
These articles brought scholarly attention to the sig-
nificance of affect and atmosphere in film. All three 
scholars note that mood is more pervasive, diffuse, 
and encompassing than focused emotional states 
and less directly tied to cognition, action, or causa-
tion. According to Plantinga, most people “think of 
the mood of a narrative as its atmosphere, but it is 
also common to describe the mood of a work as the 
complex of emotions it seems to express or embody” 
(456). Plantinga distinguishes the artistic tone and af-
fective character of films from moods that films evoke 
in spectators (465). In his view, “inducing moods in 
narrative is a means of directing thought and percep-
tion” (467) and “affective character in itself is an im-
portant part of [a film’s] aesthetic worth, since such 
moods are a central component of the phenomeno-
logical experience of a narrative” (473). Sinnerbrink 
suggests mood works through the revelation of cin-
ematic worlds (148), arguing that: 
 …before focusing on character, action and narra-
 tive development, we should be attentive to how 
 the particular film-world is aesthetically revealed 
 and how we are affectively attuned to that world, 
 since this is what makes it possible for us to be re-
 sponsively engaged with what is represented with- 
 in that world. (155)
Rhym takes a phenomenological approach to the 
structure of experience and the pervasiveness and sus-
tainability of mood in time, yet his project has an af-
finity with Sinnerbrink’s because he is also interested 
in mood “as being constitutively bound up with world 
disclosure and as an existential condition of the pos-
sibilities of ‘affects’ and ‘emotions’” (482).
 As noted earlier in this article, the atmospheric 
world Stalker inhabits and the Zone that he explores 
extend beyond the diegetic space of the film. In ad-
dition to the film and the 1971 novel on which it is 
based, Roadside Picnic (Arkady and Boris Strugatsky), 
there is a series of free-roaming first-person shooter 
games adapted from the film and set in the radioac-
tive exclusion zone surrounding the nuclear power 
station, Chernobyl. Eerily, the first time the audience 
enters the Zone in the film is focalized from the opti-
cal and auditory perspective of Stalker himself, exactly 
as it occurs in the computer games when Stalker, the 
playable character, breaches the secure perimeter of 
the ecological disaster zone. In both cases, the audi-
ence is locked into Stalker’s subjectivity, acutely aware 
of the sound of his footfalls as we move toward an 
abandoned building. Participants in S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: 
Shadow of Chernobyl (2006) and its companion 
games12 have an embodied relationship with the tech-
nology of the game console itself and with the mili-
tary technology used to blast virtual opponents in the 
game world. As is conventional in such games, this 
sense of agency augments affective involvement but 
the impermanence of the player’s death curtails the in-
centive to imagine the consequences of violence. Yet, 
in other respects, the games and the film foster over-
lapping imaginative explorations of the space known 
as the Zone. The participatory elements of gameplay, 
the kinetic, adrenalized thrill of moving through the 
Zone, and the first-person audio-visual perspective 
12. S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: Clear Sky (GSC Game World, 2008); S.T.A.L.K.E.R.: 
Call of Pripyat (GSC Game World, 2009-10).
 The participatory elements of game-
play, the kinetic, adrenalized thrill 
of moving through the Zone, and the 
first-person audio-visual perspective af-
forded by the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. games 
raise questions about how new techno-
logical developments foster imaginative 
engagement. 
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afforded by the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. games raise questions 
about how new technological developments foster 
imaginative engagement. 
 With a virtual reality (VR) 3D driver such as 
VorpX, the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. games can be played us-
ing VR devices like Oculus Rift and noise-cancelling 
stereophonic headphones. This technology gives an 
agentic, immersive experience of the Zone complete 
with the concussive impact of heavy artillery while 
the player navigates through the abandoned town of 
Pripyat and explores real landmarks, such as its rust-
ing Ferris wheel.13 As Lisa Coulthard writes, sound 
has immersive qualities “because hearing is thought to 
be an intimate, more enveloping sense: sound is felt 
throughout the body, takes place in the head of the 
spectator, and is pervasive (we cannot close our ears 
as we can our eyes)” (“Affect” 54). While Coulthard 
would characterise the S.T.A.L.K.E.R. games as privi-
leging “affective intensity” over imaginative or emo-
tional engagement, perhaps the emotive, enveloping 
soundscape of VR can engage imagination in novel 
ways. Angela McArthur and colleagues point out that 
VR “elicits new possibilities for the treatment of sound 
in space. Distinct from screen-based practices of film-
making, diegetic sound-image relations in immersive 
environments present unique, potent affordances, in 
which content is at once imaginary, and real” (26). 
The merging of biological and technological perceptu-
al apparatuses and the experience of presence and mo-
tion are augmented in VR and game environments, 
affording enhanced experiences of emplacement, im-
mersion, and agency compared to cinema. As film 
scholar and sound designer Damian Candusso details, 
contemporary film sound practitioners must adapt 
to new forms of audio spatialisation and headphone 
delivery when crafting imaginative emplacement in 
VR environments through 3D sonic experience (1). 
Further research is needed in this quickly developing 
field, but throughout this article I have treated vari-
ances among imaginative experiences of the Zone in 
film versions, games, and VR as differences of degree 
rather than kind in terms of philosophical accounts of 
imaginative engagement with audiovisual media. 
 What have we learned from Stalker through this 
analysis of aesthetic emplacement in the acoustic and 
atmospheric milieu that evokes mood, focuses atten-
tion, and guides imagination through the Zone? I 
13. Another audiovisual exploration of the Zone, The Chernobyl VR 
Project, uses immersive 3D sound recordings and location images cap-
tured by drones and mapped onto 3D shape scans to enable a virtual 
tour of the forbidden zone thirty years after the nuclear disaster, invit-
ing participants to imagine Soviet life in the 1980s and the devastation 
caused by nuclear fall-out.
have argued that mood is communicated by cinema’s 
most immersive elements—the mise-en-scène and the 
tonal, tactile, enveloping qualities of the evocative, 
acousmatic soundscape. I have shown that mood is re-
lated to place-making and emplacement in the narra-
tive world; similarly, emplacement can be understood 
as a form of mood-making in the film, games, and 
VR simulations that are based on the Zone that Stalk-
er traverses.14 In Stalker, the enveloping elements of 
film style establish a mood that focuses the audience’s 
imagination on salient affective aspects of the charac-
ters’ environment and their perceptual and subjective 
experiences, which are rendered strange, yet haunt-
ingly familiar through the synaesthetic translation of 
sound and image into affect and felt understanding. 
To conclude, imaginative activity does not necessarily 
involve forging mental copies of sensory stimuli. In-
stead, it works with sensory incompleteness to bridge 
disjunctures between sound and image and to gener-
ate suppositions and affective impressions. This elici-
tation of imaginative discernment through the evoca-
tion, mediation, and translation of sound and image 
in cinema recruits affective and cognitive activity that 
far exceeds the production of images. 
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